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Experimenting with Behavior Based Pricing 
 
Abstract 
 
Many purchases of differentiated goods are repeated, giving sellers the opportunity to engage in 
price discrimination based upon the shopper’s previous behavior by either offering loyalty 
discounts to repeat buyers or introductory rates to new customers.  Recent theoretical work 
suggests that loyalty discounts are likely to be implemented when customer preferences are not 
stationary and sellers can pre-commit to prices for repeat buyers, but otherwise repeat buyers can 
be expected to pay the same or more than new buyers.  This paper reports the results of a series 
of controlled laboratory experiments designed to empirically test the impact of these factors on 
pricing strategies, seller profit and total cost to consumers.  Absent price pre-commitments, 
sellers in the lab engage in poaching when it is optimal to do so, but the ability to pre-commit 
leads to prices being relatively more favorable to loyal customers.  Customer poaching increases 
seller profit and increases total consumer costs in the case of stable consumer preferences 
without price pre-commitment.   
 
Keywords:  Loyalty Discounts, Poaching, Repeat Purchases, Price Discrimination  
JEL codes: C71, C91, D41  
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Introduction  
 
Sellers have long engaged in various forms of price discrimination (see Stole, 2007; Varian, 
1989).  However, recent technological advances give sellers even more information about their 
customers including the ability to track people across shopping episodes.  This enables sellers, 
both online and in bricks and mortar stores, to identify which customers are making a repeat visit 
and which are new.  With such information sellers can either attempt to reward loyalty or poach 
from rivals.  Indeed, both practices are now commonly observed.  Many airlines and retailers 
offer perks to loyal customers, while credit cards and insurance companies commonly advertise 
low introductory rates to new customers. In each of these cases sellers are basing prices on the 
shopper’s previous behavior.  
 
Caillaud and De Nijs (2011, p. 1) define the practice of “offering different prices to different 
customers according to their past purchase history” as behavior based pricing (BBP).  This 
practice, which does not fit any of the traditional categories of price dissemination, has also been 
referred to as customer relationship management based pricing (Shih and Sudhir, 2007), pricing 
with customer recognition (Esteves, 2010a, 2010b; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Villas-Boas, 
1999; Villas-Boas, 2004) or one-to-one pricing (Rossi et al., 1996; Shaffer and Zhang, 1997).  
Given the popularity of both practices, there have been several recent theoretical papers that 
attempted to understand the market conditions that determine when loyalty rewards are optimal 
and when poaching is optimal (e.g. Caminal and Clarici, 2007; Caminal and Matutes, 1990; 
Chen, 1997; Chen and Pearcy, 2010; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000; Pazgal and Soberman, 2008; 
Villas-Boas, 1999; Shin and Sudhir, 2007, 2010).2 
 
While the optimality of poaching or loyalty discounts depends on the assumptions of the specific 
model, generally poaching is found to be optimal.  The general reasoning is that initial purchases 
help sellers identify the customers who value their product most and thus can be exploited later; 
that is the first period is used to segment the market.  For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) 
                                                            
2 Based on the empirical analysis of Swedish newspaper subscriptions, Asplund, Eriksson and Strnad 
(2008) report that in competitive markets, the use of discounts to poach is inversely related to the seller’s 
market share. There has also been work in monopoly settings considering pricing to new and repeat 
customers (e.g. Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Bikhchandani and McCardle, 2012; Villas-Boas, 2004).   
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use a simple two firm, two period Hotelling model where there is a continuum of relative brand 
preferences by customers.  When customers’ preferences do not change over time, the second 
period is essentially competition over two distinct markets, one for customers who prefer the 
seller and one for customers who prefer the rival.  To capture the rival’s customers, the seller 
must offer a low poaching price.  However, Caminal and Matutes (1990) find that under the 
conditions of independent customer preferences and price pre-commitment for loyal customers, 
it can be more profitable for sellers to reward their own high-valued customers.  Similar results 
are obtained by Shin and Sudhir (2007, 2010), who studied a market with high and low quantity 
demanded customers (see also Shaffer and Zhang, 2000).  
 
In a recent paper, Chen and Pearcy (2010) develop a model that captures several key pieces of 
the behavior based pricing problem.  They also consider a basic two period duopoly Hotelling 
model and show that the optimality of rewarding loyalty versus poaching depends on 1) the 
ability to pre-commit to future prices for repeat customers and 2) the degree to which buyer 
preferences vary between periods.  In particular, Chen and Pearcy (2010) show that regardless of 
the ability to pre-commit to future prices, a lack of heterogeneity across time should lead to 
poaching.  However, when there is heterogeneity in preferences over time and sellers can 
guarantee a future price to repeat buyers then loyalty is rewarded.  The logic is that the low 
future price induces people to visit the seller initially and attract back those who may ultimately 
find themselves preferring the competitor in the future without having to offer low prices to 
those who do not visit initially but change to preferring that seller in the future.  If there is 
sufficient heterogeneity and an inability to commit to future prices then the market essentially 
becomes a repeated single period Hotelling game as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). 
 
While sellers routinely have to make the decision to poach or offer loyalty discounts, it can be 
difficult to study such markets empirically, because customer preferences and “distance costs” 
are inherently unobservable.  Therefore, we turn to controlled laboratory experiments to 
empirically explore how the factors identified by Caminal and Matutes (1990), Chen and Pearcy 
(2010), and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) among others impact behavior based pricing.  Our 
paper reports the results of a series of market experiments, which vary the degree of 
heterogeneity in shopper preferences between periods and the ability of sellers to pre-commit to 
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prices for loyal customers.  Of course, naturally occurring markets have a myriad of other 
complicating factors such as more than two sellers being in operation, buyers making decisions 
over more than two periods, people entering and exiting the market asynchronously, etc.  The 
goal in developing a theoretical model or an experiment is to focus on the interplay of the key 
elements.  Thus controlled laboratory experiments are an ideal tool for cleanly examining seller 
reactions to factors the model has identified as strategically important.   
 
Despite the recent theoretical work on behavior based pricing, the only related laboratory 
experiments of which we are aware are by Mahmood (2011) and Mahmood and Vulkan (2012), 
both of which are in the vein of Shin and Sudhir (2010) and in settings where loyalty discounts 
are not expected. Mahmood (2011) considers a discrete version of a high and low volume 
customer environment and allows for preference mobility.3  Behaviorally, Mahmood (2011) does 
not observe loyalty discounts in any of the treatments and does observe poaching with customer 
recognition as anticipated.  Mahmood and Vulkan (2012) conduct an experiment with 
professionals from a variety of industries.  These experiments also involved high and low 
volume customers and varied the market structure (two firms on a Hotelling line or four firms on 
a Sallop circle) and the ability to price discriminate based on type. Their results suggest that 
greater competition reduces the magnitude of poaching and can encourage loyalty discounts.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section lays out the theoretical 
framework for the markets examined in the lab.  The experimental design and the experimental 
results are then presented in separate sections.  A final section offers conducing remarks.   
 
Market Structure 
 
Our market structure follows that of Chen and Pearcy (2010).  There are two firms ݂ ∈ ሾܣ, ܤሿ 
selling differentiated products a la a linear Hotelling model.  For simplicity, we use the notation 
                                                            
3 The environment is discrete in that there are only a few buyers who make purchase decisions rather than a 
continuum as in the theoretical model.  This is due to the use of human subjects as buyers in those experiments.  It is 
possible that equilibria differ between the continuous and discrete cases, but it is not clear which is more informative 
as to behavior in any particular naturally occurring market.  
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– ݂ to denote ݂’s rival.  Firms sell their products in two periods, n=1, 2.  Customers demand one 
unit in the first period and one unit in the second period.  Each period, customers are distributed 
uniformly over an interval of length ̅ߠ.  Firm A is located at 0 while Firm B is located at ̅ߠ.  In 
period n, a customer located at ߠ෠ receives a utility of v - pA - ߠ෠ for purchasing from A at price pA 
and receives a utility of v - pB - (̅ߠ - ߠ෠) from buying from B at price pB. v is assumed to be 
sufficiently high that all buyers will purchase a unit in both periods.  Total consumer cost in 
period n are denoted by Cn and include the price paid to a seller plus travel costs. In period 2, 
Firm f can identify customers who visited Firm f in period 1.  Therefore, each firm sets three 
prices:  ଵܲ
௙ is Firm f’s price in period 1, ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ is Firm f’s price in period 2 for repeat (loyal) 
customers, and 	 ଶܲ௙ is Firm f’s price in period 2 for new customers.  Sellers incur a constant 
marginal cost, c, for each unit sold.  
 
With this basic framework, we consider the implications of two factors.  The first is the 
relationship between buyer preferences in period 1 and period 2.  Although Chen and Pearcy 
(2010) allow for a continuum of relationships, we focus on the two extreme cases:  buyer 
preferences are independently determined each period and buyer preferences are fixed over 
time.4 The second is the timing of when ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ is set:  before or after buyers make their period 1 
decisions.  That is, whether or not sellers pre-commit to loyalty prices.  Other prices are always 
set at the start of the period for which the price is in effect.  The combinations of the two factors 
yield four distinct cases. A firm is said to poach if  ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ > 	 ଶܲ௙ and offer a loyalty discount if the 
inequality is reversed.  Given the sequential nature of the market, the appropriate solution 
concept is that of subgame perfection. While Chen and Pearcy (2010) characterize the 
equilibrium, for our purposes it is also critical to identify the best response functions for both 
sellers in period 2 and buyers in period 1 in case observed first period seller behavior is off the 
equilibrium path.  Buyers in period 2 will simply choose to purchase from the seller offering the 
lower total cost at that point.   
 
 
                                                            
4 Chen and Pearcy (2010) model the preference relationship between periods using a copula with a continuous 
parameter α.  Our cases correspond to theirs for α =0 and α =1.   
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Case 1: Independent Preferences and No Price Commitment   
In this case, buyers are randomly relocated after the first period.  Therefore, in period 2 the 
sellers are essentially competing on two independent Hotelling lines of length ̅ߠ.  The line for 
people who purchased from A in period 1 accounts for a fraction ఏ
∗
ఏഥ  of the total market and the 
remainder are uniformly distributed over the other line.  Hence, the second period profit 
maximization problem for Firm A is to 
max
௉	෩ మಲ,௉మಲ
ఏ∗
ఏഥ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஺ െ ܿ൯ܴ ൅ ቀ1 െ
ఏ∗
ఏഥ ቁ ሺ ଶܲ஺ െ ܿሻܵ  
where R and S denote the location of the customers who did and did not visit Firm A in period 1, 
respectively, and who are now indifferent between the two firms in period 2 given the relevant 
period 2 prices.  For concreteness,  
ܴ ≡ ఏഥା௉మಳି௉	෩ మಲଶ     ܵ ≡
ఏഥା௉	෩ మಳି௉మಲ
ଶ   
Firm B has a similar objective function.  The first order conditions yield the following period 2 
best response conditions:  
ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ఏഥଶ ൅
௉	෩ మష೑
ଶ ൅
௖
ଶ and ܲ	෩ ଶ
௙ ൌ ఏഥଶ ൅
௉మష೑
ଶ ൅
௖
ଶ. 
From these conditions it is straight forward to show that in equilibrium 
ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ ൌ c ൅ θത.      (1) 
In period 1, customers will decide where to shop based on the observed period 1 prices and the 
prices they expect to observe in period 2.  θ∗ can be identified by equating the expected utility of 
visiting Firm A in period 1 with the expected utility of visiting Firm B in period 1.  That is ߠ∗ is 
such that  
ݒ െ ଵܲ஺ െ ߠ∗ ൅ ׬ ሺݒ െ ߠ െ ܿ െ ̅ߠሻ ଵఏഥ
ோ
଴ ݀ߠ ൅ ׬ ሾݒ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠሻ െ ܿ െ ̅ߠሿ
ఏഥ
ோ
ଵ
ఏഥ ݀ߠ =  
ݒ െ ଵܲ஻ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻ ൅ ׬ ሺݒ െ ̅ߠ െ ܿ െ ߠሻ ଵఏഥ
ௌ
଴ ݀ߠ ൅ ׬ ሾݒ െ ̅ߠ െ ܿ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻሿ
ఏഥ
ௌ
ଵ
ఏഥ ݀ߠ, 
which holds when ߠ∗ ൌ ௉భಳି௉భಲଶ ൅
ఏഥ
ଶ.  The integration arises due to the fact that in period 1, the 
customer does not know what her period 2 preferences will be.  Given this, one can derive that 
the equilibrium first period prices are ଵܲ஺ ൌ ଵܲ஻ ൌ ܿ ൅ ̅ߠ.  In this case, firms do not reward 
loyalty or engage in poaching, making it an attractive baseline for comparing behavior across 
treatments. 
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Case 2: Constant Preferences and No Price Commitment   
In this case, the buyers do not change their preferences between periods.  Hence, in the second 
period the sellers will be competing over two non-overlapping markets, one consisting of buyers 
that are close to A and one consisting of buyers that are close to B.  Each seller will end up 
setting high price in period 2 to those known to prefer it and low poaching prices to buyers who 
are known to prefer the rival.   
 
Formally, the second period profit functions of the two firms are given by  
ߨଶ஺ ൌ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஺ െ ܿ൯ܴ ൅ ሺ ଶܲ஺ െ ܿሻሺܵ െ ߠ∗ሻ and  
ߨଶ஻ ൌ ሺ ଶܲ஻ െ ܿሻሺߠ∗ െ ܴሻ ൅ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ െ ܿ൯ሺ̅ߠ െ ܵሻ 
where R and S are defined as before.  Simultaneously solving the four first order conditions 
yields the optimal second period prices: 
ଶܲ஺ ൌ ̅ߠ ൅ ܿ െ ସଷ ߠ∗  ܲ	෩ ଶ஺ ൌ
ఏഥ
ଷ ൅
ଶ
ଷ ߠ∗ ൅ ܿ 
ଶܲ஻ ൌ ସଷ ߠ∗ ൅ ܿ െ
ఏഥ
ଷ  ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ ൌ ̅ߠ ൅ ܿ െ
ଶ
ଷ ߠ∗. 
 
Therefore after observing the period 1 prices ߠ∗is such that 
ݒ െ ߠ∗ െ ଵܲ஺ ൅ ݒ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻ െ 43ߠ
∗ െ ܿ ൅ ̅ߠ3 ൌ 
ݒ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻ െ ଵܲ஻ ൅ ݒ െ ߠ∗ െ ̅ߠ െ ܿ ൅ ସଷ ߠ∗, 
which reduces to ߠ∗ ൌ ଷ଼ ሺ ଵܲ஻ െ ଵܲ஺ሻ ൅
ఏഥ
ଶ.  The optimal period 2 prices can thus be rewritten as   
ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ ൅
௉భ೑
ଶ െ
௉భష೑
ଶ  and    (2a) 
ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ ൌ ଶఏ
ഥ
ଷ ൅ ܿ െ
௉భ೑
ସ ൅
௉భష೑
ସ .     (2b) 
It is straight forward to show that the equilibrium prices are given by ଵܲ
௙ ൌ ସఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ, ܲ	෩ ଶ
௙ ൌ ଶఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ, 
and ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ, from which it is clear that new customers are being poached with a discount of 
ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ െ ଶܲ௙	= ఏ
ഥ
ଷ.  A second interesting feature of the equilibrium is that all second period prices 
should be less than first period prices.   
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The above analysis applies so long as ଶܲ஺, ܲ	෩ ଶ஺, ଶܲ஻, ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ 	൒ ܿ, which holds for θ∗ ∈ ቂθതସ ,
ଷθത
ସ ቃ.  When 
θ∗ ൏ 	 θതସ, firm 2 will only push its price for new customers down to cost, i.e. ଶܲ୆ ൌ ܿ, to which 
firm 1 will respond by setting ܲ	෩ ଶ୅ ൌ θത െ 2θ∗ ൅ c.  Similarly, when θ∗ ൐ 	 θതସ  then ଶܲ୅ ൌ ܿ and 
ܲ	෩ ଶ୆ ൌ 2θ∗ െ θത ൅ c.5    
 
Case 3:  Independent Preferences with Price Commitment   
In this case, sellers will be competing over two independent lines in period 2, but they will have 
already set their price for the line involving their repeat customers.  Thus there is only one choice 
variable for a firm in period 2, the price to charge new customers, which can be a function of the 
rival’s price to repeat customers.  The somewhat surprising result is that in this case sellers offer 
lower prices to their repeat customers.  The intuition is that a seller wants to guarantee a low 
repeat price so as to attract customers in period 1, but in period 2 the seller finds it better to 
exploit the new customers who are close by, rather than trying to compete with the rival’s low 
loyalty price.   
 
With independent preferences and repeat price commitment, the second period profit functions 
for A and B are 
ߨଶ஺ ൌ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஺ െ ܿ൯ ఏ
∗
ఏഥ ܴ ൅ ሺ ଶܲ஺ െ ܿሻܵ ቀ1 െ
ఏ∗
ఏഥ ቁ and 
ߨଶ஻ ൌ ఏ
∗
ఏഥ ሺ̅ߠ െ ܴሻሺ ଶܲ஻ െ ܿሻ ൅ ቀ1 െ
ఏ∗
ఏഥ ቁ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ െ ܿ൯ሺ̅ߠ െ ܵሻ. 
The resulting optimal prices for new customers in period 2 are given by: 
ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ఏഥଶ ൅
௖
ଶ ൅
௉	෩ మష೑
ଶ .     (3) 
As in Case 1, ߠ∗ is determined taking into account that the buyers do not know what their 
preferences will be in period 2.  The solution that  
ߠ∗ ൌ ሺ ଵܲ
஻ െ ଵܲ஺ሻ
2 ൅
̅ߠ
2 ൅
൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ െ ܲ	෩ ଶ஺൯
2 ൬
7
8 ൅
ܿ
8̅ߠ൰ ൅
൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஺൯ଶ െ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஻൯ଶ
32̅ߠ  
comes from equating  
ݒെߠ∗ െ ଵܲ஺ ൅ ׬ ൣݒ െ ߠ െ ܲ	෩ ଶ஺൧ ଵఏഥ
ோ
଴ ݀ߠ ൅ ׬ ሾݒ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠሻ െ ଶܲ஻ሿ
ఏഥ
ோ
ଵ
ఏഥ ݀ߠ with 
                                                            
5 Empirically, there was a single instance for which θ∗ ∉ ቂ஘ഥସ ,
ଷ஘ഥ
ସ ቃ in the experimental investigation of this case.  
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ݒ െ ଵܲ஻ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻ ൅ ׬ ሺݒ െ ଶܲ஺ െ ߠሻௌ଴ ଵఏഥ ݀ߠ ൅ ׬ ൣݒ െ ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠሻ൧
ఏഥ
ௌ
ଵ
ఏഥ ݀ߠ. 
Sellers of course take into account how their period 1 choices of ଵܲ
௙and ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ affect ߠ∗.  The 
resulting subgame perfect equilibrium prices are ଵܲ
௙ ൌ ସఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ, ܲ	෩ ଶ
௙ ൌ െ ఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ, and ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ఏഥଷ ൅ ܿ.  
The loyalty discount is the difference between ଶܲ
௙ െ ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ and equals ଶଷ ̅ߠ.  It is also interesting to 
note that the first period price and the second period price for new customers should be the same 
in Cases 2 and 3.  The only change in equilibrium behavior is the price charged to loyal 
customers, which should now be below cost.  Also as in Case 2, all period 2 prices are below 
those in period 1. 
 
Case 4: Constant Preferences with Price Commitment  
Like Case 2, the sellers are competing over two distinct regions, but as in Case 3, each firm has a 
single choice variable in period 2.  Therefore, the second period profit functions are simpler than 
those of Case 2.  Specifically: 
ߨଶ஺ ൌ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஺ െ ܿ൯ܴ ൅ ሺ ଶܲ஺ െ ܿሻሺܵ െ ߠ∗ሻ 
ߨଶ஻ ൌ ሺ ଶܲ஻ െ ܿሻሺߠ∗ െ ܴሻ ൅ ൫ܲ	෩ ଶ஻ െ ܿ൯ሺ̅ߠ െ ܵሻ 
 
The first order conditions give: 
ଶܲ஺ ൌ ఏഥା௉	෩ మ
ಳା௖
ଶ െ ߠ∗  ଶܲ஻ ൌ
ିఏഥା௉	෩ మಲା௖
ଶ ൅ ߠ∗. 
As buyer preferences do not change, ߠ∗can be found by setting 
ݒ െ ߠ∗െ ଵܲ஺ ൅ ݒ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻ െ ߠ∗ ൅ ఏഥଶ െ
௉	෩ మಲ
ଶ െ
௖
ଶ =  
ݒ െ ሺ̅ߠ െ ߠ∗ሻെ ଵܲ஻ ൅ ݒ െ ߠ∗ ൅ ߠ∗ െ ఏഥଶ െ
௉	෩ మಳ
ଶ െ
௖
ଶ, 
which yields ߠ∗ ൌ ൫௉భಳି௉భಲ൯ଶ ൅
ఏഥ
ଶ ൅
൫௉	෩ మಳି௉	෩ మಲ൯
ସ .  Therefore, the period 2 best responses can be written 
as 
ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ௖ଶ ൅
௉భ೑
ଶ െ
௉భష೑
ଶ ൅
௉	෩ మ೑
ସ ൅
௉	෩ మష೑
ସ .    (4) 
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As a result, equilibrium prices are ଵܲ
௙ ൌ ̅ߠ ൅ ܿ, ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ ൌ ఏ
ഥ
ଶ ൅ ܿ, and ଶܲ
௙ ൌ ఏഥସ ൅ ܿ.  Here new 
customers receive a discount of ఏ
ഥ
ସ and as in Cases 2 and 3 all second period prices are expected to 
be below first period prices.   
 
Experimental Design 
 
To explore BBP, we conducted a series of controlled laboratory experiments using a 2 × 2 
design.  Corresponding to the four cases modeled in the previous section, the first dimension was 
the relationship of preferences between periods (fixed or independent) and the second dimension 
was the ability to pre-commit to the price charged to repeat customers (not possible or possible).  
The parameters preferences used in the experiment were ̅ߠ = 120 and ܿ = 50.  While these 
parameters are somewhat arbitrary, they lead to clear separation in predicted prices.  The 
resulting price predictions are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Price Predictions 
Case 1-Baseline 2 3 4 
Buyer Preferences Independent Fixed Independent Fixed 
Price Pre-commitment No No Yes Yes 
ଵܲ
௙ 170 210 210 170 
ܲ	෩ ଶ௙ 170 130 10 110 
ଶܲ
௙ 170 90 90 80 
ߨ௙ 14 400 13 600 8 000 12 750 
C 48 000 47 200 36 800 40 350 
 
In order to aide subject comprehension, the task was presented to subjects as a problem faced by 
a pair of ice cream vendors located at opposite end of a beach on a crowded day.  Each “day” in 
the experiment a subject could set a morning price for everyone and separate afternoon prices for 
repeat and new customers.  As explained to the subjects, all of the buyers in the market were 
computerized robots who determined their decisions based only on price and travel distance and 
behaved optimally given the observed prices (that is ߠ∗, R, and S followed the derivations in the 
previous section).  For simplicity, each subject was presented the task as though she was firm A 
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located at 0 and their rival was firm B located at ̅ߠ =120.  Figure 1 shows a sample image of the 
subject screen in the baseline case. 
 
Figure 1:  Subject Decision Screen in Baseline Case 
 
 
 
A session consisted of four subjects.  To eliminate repeated play incentives, each “day” subjects 
were randomly and anonymously rematched with someone else in their session.  Treatment 
effects are evaluated between subjects as each session involved only a single treatment case. 
After entering the lab, subjects read printed instructions and completed a comprehension handout 
(both available in the Appendix).  Once everyone had completed the handout the experiment 
began.  The experiment lasted 20 “days” and the subjects were paid their cumulative earnings, 
which were converted from the lab dollars used in the experiment to cash at the rate of 2500 Lab 
Dollars = US$0.10.  Subjects did not know in advance how many “days” the experiment would 
last, but did know the exchange rate.   
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The experiments were conducted in The Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the 
University of Arkansas.  Multiple sessions in different treatments were conducted concurrently 
so as to eliminate the effect of any uncontrolled nuisance variables and to further mask the 
identity of one’s rival in any given period.  The participants were drawn from the lab’s 
participant database, which is comprised primarily of undergraduate students.  None of the 
subjects had participated in any related studies although some had participated in other unrelated 
experiments.  As is standard in the lab, subjects were paid a $5 participation payment for the 
approximately one hour experiment in addition to their salient earnings, which averaged $16.25.   
 
Experimental Results 
 
The data consist of 3840 market pricing decisions from 16 sessions (four replications of each of 
the four treatments).6  Aggregate behavior is displayed graphically in Figure 2 and summarized 
in Table 2.  
 
In the baseline case 1, where consumer preferences are independent over time and there is no 
price pre-commitment, the price should be 170 in every situation.  Figure 1 and Table 2 clearly 
show that prices are lower than predicted.  Where a buyer purchased in period 1 should have no 
effect on prices in period 2, a result affirmed in Table 2 by the lack of significance for the Loyal 
Customer Price Effect in column 1.  However, prices should be the same in the afternoon and the 
morning, a result which does not hold as afternoon prices are significantly lower as evidenced by 
the significance of the Afternoon Price Effect in column 1.  
 
In cases 2 and 4, where buyer preferences are fixed, the prediction is that afternoon prices are 
lower than morning prices and that sellers engage in poaching.  The regression results in Table 2 
indicate that both patterns hold, significantly for Case 2 and at least nominally for Case 4.  
However, in neither case the size of the loyalty discount is as large as it should be.  The reason 
for this differs between the two cases.  In case 2, prices to new customers are not as low as they 
                                                            
6 The analysis of data was done on the whole dataset.  The results remain qualitatively unchanged if the first ten 
“days” are dropped.   
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should be whereas in case 4, prices to loyal customers are not as high as they should be.  For 
both cases morning prices are lower than the predicted value.  
 
Figure 2:  Distribution of Prices 
  
Note: Solid line represents prices predicted by model. 
 
We now turn to case 3, where sellers are predicted to offer discounts to loyal customers because 
buyer preferences vary over time and price pre-commit is available.  As in the other cases, 
morning prices are significantly too low (see Table 2).  While sellers are offering nominally 
higher prices to new customers, the difference is not statistically significant.  The main driving 
factor is that sellers are generally unwilling to commit to pricing below cost as required by the 
model.  From Figure 1, it is clear that although some sellers in this setting do price below cost, 
the vast majority price above cost.  Still, in the other three cases sellers essentially never price 
below cost and rarely price close to cost.  One possible explanation is that subjects exhibit loss 
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aversion.  In addition, as shown in Table 1 this practice actually leads to much lower profits for 
the sellers so they have an incentive to avoid it. Alternatively, subjects may consider pricing 
below cost as socially inappropriate “predatory pricing” or an unfair trade practice (e.g. Bolton, 
Brodley and Riordan, 2000; Petit and Neyrinck, 2010).  
 
Table 2: Analysis of Prices by Case 
Case 1-Baseline 2 3 4 
Buyer Preferences Independent Fixed Independent Fixed 
Price Pre-commitment No No Yes Yes 
Morning Price ଵܲ
௙     
Mean 141.5 138.2 133.3 112.2 
Model 170 210 210 170 
p-value 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Price for Loyal Customers	ܲ	෩ ଶ௙     
Mean 119.7 129.2 99.6 94.6 
Model 170 130 10 110 
p-value <0.001 0.750 <0.001 0.006 
Price for New Customers	 ଶܲ௙     
Mean 116.5 114.1 104.5 86.8 
Model 170 90 90 80 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.043 0.353 
Regression Results for Comparing Prices Within a Day  
Afternoon Price Effect  -25.028** -24.041*** -28.800** -25.412** 
 (7.227) (3.094) (8.735) (5.881) 
Loyal Customer Price Effect 3.250 15.022** -4.919 7.753 
 (7.889) (3.857) (6.749) (4.933) 
Constant 141.512*** 138.172*** 133.319*** 112.213*** 
 (9.363) (1.306) (13.114) (6.581) 
Observations 960 960 960 960 
Note: The afternoon price effect is the incremental change from morning prices that applies to both ෩ܲ ଶ௙ and ଶܲ௙ 
whereas the Loyal Customer Price Effect is the incremental effect for ෩ܲ ଶ௙ relative to ଶܲ௙. Clustered standard error 
in parentheses.  ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.  For Cases 2, 3, and 4 with 
directional predictions for the size of the loyalty discount, the appropriate 1-sided hypothesis is implemented.   
 
 
At first pass, the reluctance of sellers to price below cost appears to call into question the 
predictive success of the model for identifying when loyalty discounts will be observed.  
However, further analysis reported in Table 3 shows that the intuition provided by the model 
does correspond to observed behavior in that sellers were significantly more likely to offer 
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loyalty discounts in case 3.  Specifically, Table 3, reports the results of a probit regression where 
the dependent variable equals one if the seller offered any loyalty discount in a given day and is 
zero if the seller engaged in poaching (or offered the same price to both groups).  The estimation 
in Table 3 includes case specific dummy variables.  In addition to demonstrating that loyalty 
discounts are more prevalent in case 3 as evidence by the positive and significant coefficient, 
Table 3 also clearly indicates that poaching is more common in cases 2 and 4 exactly as 
predicted.  Together these results indicate a reasonable degree of success for the model in terms 
of when poaching is likely to occur even if the magnitude is not as great as expected.        
 
Table 3: Analysis of Sellers’ Willingness to Offer Loyalty Discount by Case 
Variables Constant Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Coefficient -0.311*** -0.541*** 0.489** -0.250*** 
 (0.114) (0.106) (0.109) (0.076) 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.021 <0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is binary and equals to 1 if loyalty is present and 0 if not, we did not take into account 
situation where sellers offered the same price for new and repeated customers. Analysis is done on individual 
decision level.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
All of the preceding analysis examines unconditional behavior.  However, as shown in equations 
(1)-(4), prices set in the afternoon should depend on prices set in the morning, except in the 
baseline.  From (3), for case 3 	௉మ
೑
	௉	෩ మష೑
ൌ ଵଶ, so that as the rival’s price to loyal customers increases, 
one’s own price to new customers should increase by a smaller amount.  This means that the 
optimal loyalty discount is shrinking as overall afternoon price levels increase.  Thus, reluctance 
by sellers to price below cost would lead to smaller loyalty discounts, exactly the pattern that we 
observe.  To explore this in more detail, we conducted regression analysis of afternoon prices as 
a function of the prices set in the morning as appropriate for each case.  The results are shown in 
Table 4. 
 
In addition to showing that new customer prices increase less than one to one with the rival’s 
loyalty price, the results for case 3 in Table 4 indicate that people who set high prices for loyal 
customers also set high prices for new afternoon customers even though their own loyalty price 
should not matter.  Subjects also appear to falsely believe that rivals who set high morning prices  
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Table 4:  Afternoon Pricing Behavior as a Function of Prices Set in the Morning 
Case 1-Baseline 2 3 4 
Buyer 
Preferences 
Independent Fixed Independent Fixed 
Price  
Pre-commitment 
No No Yes Yes 
Estimated 
Equation ଶܲ
௙ 
from (1) 
෨ܲଶ௙ 
from (1) 
ଶܲ
௙ 
from (2a) 
෨ܲଶ௙ 
from (2b) 
ଶܲ
௙ 
from (3) 
ଶܲ
௙ 
from (4) 
Constant       
       Predicted 170 170 90 130 85 25 
       Observed 61.517*** 47.860** 30.158 13.287*** 22.635*** 15.652 
 (18.714) (19.022) (21.335) (2.394) (4.445) (14.939) 
       p-value  <0.001 <0.001 0.0050 <0.001 <0.001 0.5315 
ଵܲ
௙       
       Predicted 0 0 0.5 -0.25 0 0.5 
       Observed 0.157*** 0.270** 0.334*** 0.601*** 0.177 0.072 
 (0.053) (0.108) (0.072) (0.029) (0.149) (0.075) 
       p-value  0.0029 0.0122 0.0207 <0.001 0.2341 <0.001 
ଵܲ
ି௙       
       Predicted 0 0 -0.5 0.25 0 -0.5 
       Observed 0.232*** 0.238*** 0.273*** 0.238*** 0.152* 0.107 
 (0.041) (0.031) (0.096) (0.042) (0.078) (0.066) 
       p-value  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.7676 0.0509 <0.001 
෨ܲଶ௙       
       Predicted - - - - 0 0.25 
       Observed     0.207** 0.338*** 
     (0.094) (0.063) 
       p-value      0.0276 0.1674 
෨ܲଶି௙       
       Predicted - - - - .5 0.25 
       Observed     0.175*** 0.203*** 
     (0.035) (0.028) 
       p-value      <0.001 0.0906 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the session level are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  P-values are for testing the null hypothesis that the observed behavior is 
equal to the predicted value against the two sided null hypotheses.  
 
are likely to set high afternoon prices for new customers and respond with higher prices.  This 
belief is also found in the other cases as well, although it is justified in cases 1 and 2 as a higher 
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morning price does lead to higher afternoon prices.  For case 2, this can explain why subjects are 
raising their prices when they should be lowering them.  Although a higher morning price by 
one’s rival pushes ߠ∗ away and thus calls for a lower price than in equilibrium, this predicted 
response is assuming that the rival will behave optimally in stage 2.  If a rival that charges too 
high a price in the morning will also charge too high of a price in the afternoon then it makes 
sense not to lower one’s own price relative to the equilibrium.  
 
We return to session level analysis to ask how the treatment variables impact price levels.  To do 
this, we estimate ௜࣪௧ ൌ ߚଵ	 ൅ ߚଶ	ܵݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଷܲݎ݁ܿ݋݉݉݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߝ௜௧, where ࣪ is a price; 
݅	߳	ሺ1, 64ሻ is a subject; ݐ	߳	ሺ1, 20ሻ is a day; ߝ௜௧~	ܰ	ሺ0, ߪ௞ଶሻ and ݇	߳	ሺ1,16ሻ is a session.  ܵݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ 
is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is from a session where buyer 
preferences are stable and is 0 otherwise.  ܲݎ݁ܿ݋݉݉݅ݐ݉݁݊ݐ is an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if the observation is from a session where price pre-commitment is possible and is 0 
otherwise.  The regression results are presented in Table 5 with standard errors clustered at the 
session level.  Based on the evidence in Table 5, it appears that price levels are driven by the 
ability to pre-commit to prices for loyal customers and not the variability in customer 
preferences.  Specifically, the ability to pre-commit leads to lower prices in the morning, lower 
prices for new customers in the afternoon and for loyal customers in the afternoon.   
 
Table 5: Impact of Market Characteristics on Prices, Sellers Profit and Total Consumer Costs 
 Morning 
Price 
Price for Loyal 
Customers 
Price for New 
Customers 
Sellers Profit Total 
Consumer 
Costs 
Preference  -12.223 2.186 -10.036 -317.9196 -1139.76 
Stability (8.134) (7.691) (6.951) (946.083) (0.507) 
  
Price  -17.077** -27.367*** -19.648*** -2475.61** -4451.95** 
Commitment (8.134) (7.691) (6.951) (932.170) (0.009) 
  
Constant 145.954*** 123.351*** 120.326*** 9497.779*** 38619.31*** 
(7.364) (9.47) (7.511) (883.226) (<0.001) 
  
Observations 1280 1280 1280 1280 640 
Note: Standard error in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 also reports how the treatment variables impact seller profits and consumer costs.  It is 
important to note that profit and costs do not need to move with prices since customers 
experience incur travel costs and prices affect market share.  The results in Table 5 reveal that 
pre-commitment significantly lowers seller profit and it is also detrimental to shoppers.  The later 
result is intuitive in that sellers can exploit the better information about shoppers in the afternoon 
when preferences are fixed, while the former result is less intuitive but driven by the overall 
lower price level.   
 
Figure 3 shows morning and afternoon profit for each case.  Across all conditions, a majority of 
seller profit is achieved in the morning.  Without price pre-commitment, sellers are able to 
extract relatively large afternoon profits when they know the preferences of shoppers.  The figure 
also shows that the lower profits with price pre-commitment are driven by reductions in 
afternoon profits, when both repeat and new customer prices are low.  Further, the lost profit 
from the competitive pressure of pre-commitment more than offsets the benefit of knowing the 
preferences of shoppers.   
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Figure 3:  Comparison of Morning and Afternoon Profit (means) by Case 
 
Note: Dash lines represent values predicted by the model.  
 
Figure 4 plots consumer costs in the morning and the afternoon for each case.  The figure clearly 
shows that in total cost to consumers in the morning is similar in cases 1, 2, and 3, but is lower in 
case 4.  The graph also shows that afternoon consumer costs are lower when sellers have price 
pre-commitment (cases 3 and 4) then when sellers cannot (cases 1 and 2).  However, the stability 
of consumer preferences has the opposite impact from what was expected.  In cases without price 
pre-commitment (cases 1 and 2), fixed consumer preferences increase total consumer costs in the 
afternoon, while in cases where sellers can engage in price pre-commit for repeated buyers 
(cases 3 and 4) total consumer costs increase when buyer preferences are not fixed.   
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Figure 4:  Comparison of Morning and Afternoon Total Customer Costs (means) by Case 
 
Note: Dash lines represent values predicted by the model.  
 
Finally, we compare how similar observed profits and total consumer costs are to their predicted 
levels for each treatment.  To do this, we conduct the following analysis:  ܦ௜௧ ൌ ߚଵ	 ൅
ߚଶ	ܥܽݏ݁ଶ ൅ ߚଷܥܽݏ݁ଷ ൅ ߚସ	ܥܽݏ݁ସ ൅ ߝ௜௧, where ܦ denotes the difference between the observed 
and predicted level of the specific welfare measure where ܥܽݏ ௝݁ is an indicator variable that 
takes the value 1 if the observation is from Case j and is 0 otherwise.  The results, show in 
Table 6, indicate that for three of the cases seller profits and total consumer costs are well below 
the predicted levels.  However, in Case 3 profits and consumer costs are similar to the predicted 
levels.  In Cases 1, 2, and 4 sellers are observed to be engaging in strong competition, which is 
pushing prices down harming profits to the benefit of consumers. However, when shopper 
preferences are not fixed and price pre-commitment is possible sellers are unwilling to price 
below costs and fully exploit loyalty pricing.  This has the effect of weakening competitive 
pressure and increasing profits in exactly the case where profits were predicted to be the lowest.      
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Table 6: Comparison of Observed and Predicted Welfare Measures  
Analysis of Seller Profit 
Regression    
p-value for Ho: i=0 <0.001 0.087 <0.001 0.373 
Test Observed = Predicted  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Ho: 1=0 1+2=0  1+3=0 1+4=0 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.6836 <0.001 
Analysis of Total Consumer Cost  
Regression    
p-value for Ho: i=0 <0.001 0.451 0.003 0.565 
Test Observed = Predicted  Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Ho: 1=0 1+2=0  1+3=0 1+4=0 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 0.2887 <0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is Observed Value – Predicted Value. Analysis is done at the individual level for profit 
and at the market level for consumer cost.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper reports an experimental investigation of behavior based pricing for competing 
duopolists who can charge different prices to buyers with different purchase histories.  The 
setting closely follows the theoretical model developed by Chen and Pearcy (2010) in 
considering the effect of changes in buyer preferences and the ability of sellers to pre-commit to 
prices for repeat buyers when the sellers offer differentiated products to a continuum of 
shoppers.  Specifically, we conducted a series of controlled laboratory experiments varying these 
two factors resulting in four distinct market cases.  In the markets, seller set three different prices 
– a morning price, an afternoon price for loyal customers and an afternoon price to poach 
customers who visited the rival seller in the morning. 
 
The results of our experimental study generally support the comparative static results of the 
theoretical model, although the point predictions typically do not.  In general, there is less 
difference between prices in different treatments than predicted.  Morning prices are higher than 
afternoon prices as predicted in most cases, although morning prices are also higher in the 
baseline where this change is not predicted.  When buyer preferences are not stable over time 
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and sellers cannot make price pre-commitments, sellers should not differentiate between new and 
repeat customers and on average they do not.  Fixing customer preferences over time should lead 
to seller’s exploiting repeat customers and poaching new customers from rivals and this is what 
we observe.  Allowing price pre-commitment for repeat shoppers when buyer preferences are 
independent over time should lead to loyalty discounts being offered.  Loyalty discounts are 
more likely to be observed in this case, but the size of the discounts does not match the 
theoretical prediction.  This appears to be due in part to the fact that the predicted loyalty 
discounts actually involve pricing below cost, something the subject sellers were reluctant to do 
although it is far more common in this case than in any of the others.  The results also indicate 
that subject sellers are basing their prices on information that is not relevant in equilibrium.  
However, if out of equilibrium behavior is taken as a signal of future pricing then this response 
could be optimal.  For example, if one believes that a seller who sets a relatively high price in the 
morning will also overprice later in the day, then increasing one’s own afternoon prices could be 
reasonable.  Another interesting finding is that the ability to pre-commit to prices has a greater 
impact on price levels than the intertemporal relationship among buyer preferences.  In 
particular, the use of price pre-commitments lead to lower prices and thus lower profits for seller 
indicating that the practice may be something seller want to avoid.   
 
As technology continues to enable more tailored pricing and shopping experiences in general, it 
is increasingly important to understand how practices such as behavior based pricing will impact 
market outcomes.  While there has been some work on this issue form a theoretical perspective, 
there has been relatively little empirical study.  In part this may be driven by important aspects of 
the problem, such as the stability of buyer preferences, being unobservable in the field.  We use 
the laboratory to overcome this problem and believe this is a fruitful avenue for investigating 
behavior based pricing.  This is not to argue that lab experiments should be viewed as a 
substitute for field work.  Rather, the two approaches are complements as laboratory studies 
necessarily reduce the complexity and richness of the decision problem.  One specific aspect of 
the behavior based pricing practice that we believe merits future investigation is in identifying 
how buyers react to the differential pricing.  Our results are based on the assumption that buyers 
are both forward looking and profit maximizing.  Such assumptions are appropriate when 
evaluating theoretical models where this assumption is maintained as was our goal.  However, 
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the assumption that buyers will maximize their profits when making a second purchase and thus 
truthfully reveal their preferences at that point may or may not be valid.  It might be a reasonable 
assumption when buyers have little market power, but it is easy to imagine a returning customer 
becoming upset about being charged more than a new customer and as result switch sellers even 
if it means paying more.  
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Appendix A.  Subject Directions and Comprehension Handout  
[Text in brackets was not observed by the subjects.] 
 
Experiment Instructions 
In this experiment, you will be paid based in part upon your decisions.  Therefore, it is important 
that you understand the instructions completely.  If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand and someone will come to your desk.   
 
What am I doing in this Experiment?  You are a seller.   
In today’s experiment you will be in the role of a seller.  You can think of yourself as running an 
ice cream shop at a beach that is 120 yards long.  Your shop is located at one end of the beach.  
Someone else is running an ice cream shop at the other end of the beach.  Every “day” new 
people come to visit the beach and sit under their umbrellas, which are located evenly and 
continuously all along the length of the beach.    
Everyone at the beach wants to buy ice cream twice, once in the morning and once in the 
afternoon.  You and the other seller will each set your own price for ice cream.  When deciding 
where to buy their ice cream, the people on the beach look at both the price that is being charged 
and the distance in yards they have to travel to reach the shop. 
Cost to Customer = Price + Distance to Shop 
 
For example, suppose you set a price of 140 and the other seller set a price of 160  
A customer located at X = 50 yards from you and hence 70 = 120  50 yards from the other 
seller 
would incur a cost of 190 = 140 + 50 to buy from you.  
would incur a cost of 230 = 160 + 70 to buy from the other seller.  
A customer located X= 80 yards from you and hence 40 = 120  80 yards from the other seller 
would incur a cost of 220 = 140 + 80 to buy from you. 
would incur a cost of 200 = 160 + 40 to buy from the other seller. 
you
0                                                 X                                                    120
Distance = 120 ‐ XDistance = X
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[CASE 1] 
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price.   
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your afternoon prices.  You can set 
different prices for people who bought ice cream from you in the morning and for people who 
bought ice cream from the other seller in the morning.  The other seller also sets afternoon prices 
for repeat customers and for new customers who bought ice cream from you in the morning.  
After lunch people randomly choose a new location on the beach so where they were in the 
morning does not tell you anything about where they will be in the afternoon.  
 
[CASE 2] 
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price.  
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your afternoon prices.  You can set 
different prices for people who bought ice cream from you in the morning and for people who 
bought ice cream from the other seller in the morning.  The other seller also sets afternoon prices 
for repeat customers and for new customers who bought ice cream from you in the morning.  
After lunch people come back to the exact same place on the beach they were before lunch.  
 
[CASE 3] 
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price.  At the start of 
the day you and the other seller will also set your price for a second serving, the price at which a 
repeat customer can come back in the afternoon and pay for ice cream.   
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your price for customers who did not buy 
ice cream from you in the morning (that is your price for the people who bought ice cream from 
the other seller in the morning).  The price that you charge these new customers can be more 
than, less than or equal to the price you charge repeat customers.  The other seller also sets an 
afternoon price for new customers that bought ice cream from you in the morning.   
After lunch people randomly choose a new location on the beach, so where they were in the 
morning does not tell you anything about where they will be in the afternoon.  
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[CASE 4] 
At the start of the day you and the other seller will each set your morning price.  At the start of 
the day you and the other seller will also set your price for a second serving, the price at which a 
repeat customer can come back in the afternoon and pay for ice cream.  
While the people at the beach go to lunch, you can set your afternoon price for customers who 
did not buy ice cream from you in the morning (that is your price for the people who bought ice 
cream from the other seller in the morning).  The price that you charge these new customers can 
be more than, less than or equal to the price you charge repeat customers.  The other seller also 
sets an afternoon price for new customers that bought ice cream from you in the morning.   
After lunch people come back to the exact same place on the beach they were before lunch.  
 
[END CASES] 
 
If I am selling, who is buying?  Buyers are automated by the computer.   
In the afternoon, the computerized buyers simply look at the prices (the repeat customer price of 
the seller visited in the morning and new customer price of the seller not visited) and purchase 
from whichever seller offers the best deal (lowest sum of price + distance).   
For those who bought from you in the morning, based on your price for a repeat customer and 
the other seller’s price for new customers, there will be a cutoff point on the beach and everyone 
who bought from you in the morning and is now closer to you than that cutoff will buy ice cream 
from you at your repeat customer price. The rest will buy from the other seller.  Similarly, for 
those who bought from the other seller in the morning, based on your price for a new customer 
and the other seller’s price for a repeat customer, there will be a cutoff point on the beach and 
everyone who bought from the other seller in the morning and is now closer to you than that 
cutoff will buy ice cream from you at your new customer price.  The rest will buy from the other 
seller.    
 
In the morning, the computerized buyers look at the current prices, their current location, and 
what they anticipate will happen in the afternoon. The buyers anticipate that both sellers will 
choose prices optimally in the afternoon given what happens in the morning.  Computerized 
buyers then determine where to go in the morning so as to minimize their expected total cost for 
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their morning plus afternoon purchases.  This does not mean that buyers will visit the same seller 
in the morning and the afternoon.  Depending on the prices and their locations different buyers 
may anticipate visiting the same seller twice or each seller once.  Again, the result of this buyer 
behavior is that there will be a cutoff point on the beach in the morning based upon the prices 
that have been set.  Everyone closer to you than this cutoff point will buy from you at your 
morning price.  Everyone further away than this point will buy from the other seller in the 
morning. 
  
[CASES 1 & 3] 
For example, suppose that in the morning, everyone up to the cutoff of 70 comes to your shop.  If 
you set a price of 180 for repeat customers and the other shop set a price of 150 for new 
customers, then in the afternoon a person located at 45 who had come to you in the morning 
would have a cost of 225 (price + distance) from each seller.  Everyone who visited you in the 
morning and was now located closer to you than 45 would come to you as a repeat customer in 
the afternoon.  Everyone now located between 45 and 120 who had visited you in the morning 
would visit the other seller as a new customer in the afternoon.  People that were further away 
from you than 70 in the morning visited the other seller in the morning and thus would be 
comparing your new customer price and the other seller’s repeat customer price and there would 
be some cutoff for those people as well.  
 
 
 
you
0                                                                                                      120
New Repeat
you
0                             45                                                                    120
Repeat
at 180
New
at 150
People who visit you in the morning 
can be anywhere in afternoon
People who visit the other seller in the morning 
can be anywhere in the afternoon
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[CASES 2 & 4] 
For example, suppose that in the morning, everyone up to the cutoff of 70 comes to your shop.  If 
you set a price of 180 for repeat customers and the other shop set a price of 150 for new 
customers, then in the afternoon a person located at 45 would have a cost of 225 (price + 
distance) from each seller.  Everyone located closer to you than 45 would come to you as a 
repeat customer in the afternoon.  Everyone located between 45 and 70 would visit the other 
seller as a new customer in the afternoon.  People that are further away from you than 70 visited 
the other seller in the morning and thus would be comparing your new customer price and the 
other seller’s repeat customer price and there would be some cutoff for those people as well.  
 
 
[End CASES] 
 
The right hand portion of your screen will show you what happens each day.  There will be three 
bars representing the beach: a morning bar, an afternoon bar for those that visited you in the 
morning, and an afternoon bar for those that visited the other seller in the morning.   The bars 
will be color coded with your prices and customer locations in green and the other seller’s prices 
and customer locations in orange.  
 
How much am I paid?  You are paid based on your profit. 
Each unit of ice cream that you sell costs you 50.  The other seller also has a cost of 50 per unit. 
Your profit for the day is the sum of three parts: 
Morning Profit = (Morning Price – Cost of 50) × Number of Morning Customers 
Repeat Customer Profit = (Repeat Customer Price – Cost of 50) × Number of Repeat Customers 
New Customer Profit = (New Customer Price – Cost of 50) × Number of New Customers 
 
 
you
0                             45                   70                                             120
Buy from Other 
Seller in the 
morning
Repeat
at 180
Buy from You
in the morning
New
at 150
New Repeat
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[CASES 1 & 3] 
There is one customer per yard.  So the number of morning customers that you serve is equal to 
the morning cutoff point.  Your repeat customers in the afternoon include everyone who bought 
from you in the morning and is now closer to you than the cutoff for your repeat customers in the 
afternoon.  Thus your number of repeat customers is calculated as the repeat customer cutoff × 
the fraction of the buyers who visit you in the morning.  This fraction equals the morning cutoff 
÷ 120. Your new customers in the afternoon include everyone who did not buy from you in the 
morning and is now closer to you than the cutoff for your new customers in the afternoon.  Thus 
your number of new customers is calculated as the new customer cutoff × the fraction of the 
buyers who did not visit you in the morning.  This fraction equals the (120 – morning cutoff) ÷ 
120.  
 
[CASES 2 & 4] 
There is one customer per yard.  So the number of morning customers that you serve is equal to 
the morning cutoff point.  Your repeat customers in the afternoon include everyone who bought 
from you in the morning and is closer to you than the cutoff for your repeat customers in the 
afternoon.  Thus your number of repeat customers is calculated as the repeat customer cutoff.  
Your new customers in the afternoon include everyone who did not buy from you in the morning 
and is closer to you than the cutoff for your new customers in the afternoon.  Thus your number 
of new customers is calculated as the new customer cutoff – morning cutoff.               
 
[End CASES] 
 
The experiment lasts for several days, but neither you nor anyone else in the experiment knows 
how many.  After each day, the table on your screen will be updated so you have a record of the 
day’s prices, the number of morning, new and repeat customers you served, and your profit.   
Your profit for the experiment is your cumulative earnings from each day.  All the monetary 
amounts in the experiment are in lab dollars.  At the end of the experiment your lab dollar 
earnings will be converted to $US at the rate 2500 Lab Dollars = $0.10 and this is the amount 
that you will be paid in cash (in addition to the $5 you are receiving for participating).   
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Each day the customers are new, so they do not know what prices were charged on previous days 
nor do they care what prices will be charged on future days.    
   
The person in the experiment making decisions for the other ice cream shop in your market is 
randomly determined at the beginning of each and every day.  Further, no one will ever know the 
identity of the other seller in the market at any point.   
 
When you are done reading the instructions, raise your hand.  
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Appendix B.  Review Questions 
 
The following questions are designed to ensure that everyone understands the experiment before 
we begin.  Your answers will not impact your payoff in any way and you should feel free to ask 
questions at any point.  Once you are done answering the questions, please raise your hand so 
that an experimenter can verify your answers.  
 
Question 1.  Suppose that in the morning, you served customers up to the cutoff 80 yards away 
from you (so the other 40 customers went to the other seller).  If your price for repeat customers 
is 170 and the other seller’s price for new customers is 110, how many repeat customers will you 
have that afternoon?  __________ 
 
Question 2.  Suppose that you set the following prices: 
Your Morning Price = 150 
Your Afternoon Price for Repeat Customers = 150 
Your Afternoon Price for New Customers = 100 
If you have 60 customers in the morning, 30 repeat customers in the afternoon, and 40 new 
customers in the afternoon, then your profit would be ________  
 
Question 3.  You have to charge the same price to repeat and new customers.   
True or False 
 
Question 4.  In the morning, you will set your price for (afternoon) repeat customers.   
True or False 
 
Question 5.  In the morning, you will set your price for (afternoon) new customers.   
True or False 
 
Question 6.  If a customer was close to you in the morning then in the afternoon that customer  
a. will be close to you as customers are in the same place in the morning and afternoon. 
b. could be anywhere as customer’s locations are randomly picked in the afternoon.  
